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Abstract 
This work is concise evaluation of the use and abuse of the intelligence gathering efforts by any 
given State. This trend tends to be more pronounced in such transitional democracies as that of 
Nigeria. In carrying out this research, there was extensive reliance on ethnographic observation 
of events as they evolved, and are still evolving over the years in Nigeria spanning about fifteen 
decades. Other sources of information include critical analysis of archival Documents/ Reports, 
Nigerian Newspapers, Magazines, Academic Journals, Articles, Books and Internet Based 
Documented Source Materials. Similarly, data generated from convenient sample (clarification) 
interviews of selected individuals and officials from whom, in my opinion have something 
relevant to the validity and reliability of the work was used. The work tried to make modest, but 
valid attempt to identify the factors that have the capacity to increasingly dent the worth of the 
intelligence gathering capacity of the Nigerian State. These factors include; Colonialism, neo-
colonialism, militarism of the polity, legitimacy crisis, and a significantly stunted 
democratization process in Nigeria. The study found out that a State battling with the aforesaid 
crises will most likely fall prey to punitive intelligence gathering that will serve the interest of 
the minority ruling and oppressive class. In the same way, intelligence gathering will be targeted 
at dissent and opposition voices, groups and regions to silence them and consolidate illegitimate 
political power. Nigeria as a nation state has been grappling with these myriads of problems in 
ways that so far, her intelligence community has been transformed into a tool of repression 
leading to magnified escalation of security crisis in the country .It is therefore pertinent that 
democratic principles including separation of powers be implemented to ensure parliamentary 
and judicial oversight of the intelligence sector to reduce executive recklessness and 
manipulation of the intelligence sector for undue executive advantage as a state policy.  
Keywords: Intelligence, Democracy, Nigeria, Transition, National Security, Politics. 
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Introduction 
 
What Is Intelligence? 
 
Because of misuse, the word “intelligence” means different things to different people. 
The most common mistake is to consider “intelligence” as synonymous with “information.” 
Information is not intelligence. Misuse also has led to the phrase “collecting intelligence” instead 
of “collecting information.” Although intelligence may be collected by and shared with 
intelligence agencies and bureaus, field operations generally collect information (or data). 
Despite the many definitions of “intelligence” that have been promulgated over the years, 
the simplest and clearest of these is “information plus analysis equals intelligence.” The formula 
above clarifies the distinction between collected information and produced intelligence. It notes 
that without analysis, there is no intelligence. Intelligence is not what is collected; it is what is 
produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed. Intelligence is not what is collected; it is 
what is produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed. 
If intelligence is analyzed information, what is analysis? Some agencies contend that 
computer software can perform analysis for them; thus, they invest in technology rather than in 
trained analysts. However, analysis requires thoughtful contemplation that results in conclusions 
and recommendations. Thus, computers may assist with analysis by compiling large amounts of 
data into an easily accessible format, but this is only collated data; it is not analyzed data or 
information, and it falls far short of intelligence. For information to be useful, it must be 
analyzed by a trained intelligence professional. In other words, intelligence tells officials 
everything they need to know before they knowledgeably choose a course of action. For 
example, intelligence provides law enforcement executives with facts and alternatives that can 
inform critical decisions. 
Intelligence just like other social phenomenon has no shortage of definitions in a general 
usage, intelligence denotes three things (1) a particular knowledge; (2) the type of organization 
producing this knowledge; and, (3) the activity pursued by this organization (Kent, 1965). In a 
narrower Sense, intelligence is a subset of the broader category information which, in the 
hierarchy underlying modern knowledge management theory is a step in the chain of value 
creation, beginning with data which leads to information, then to knowledge and culminates into 
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wisdom. Since knowledge resides in the user and not in the collection of information, only 
human beings can take the central role in knowledge creation (DCAR, 2003). From the above 
arguments, it can be safe to define intelligence as the security-laden information gathered for the 
purpose of policy formulation to guarantee national security. This definition which is subject to 
further scrutiny as in all other social science discourses tries to operationalise the concept of 
intelligence and, reduce the raging controversies over the concept at least for academic utility.  
 
However, intelligence for all intent and purposes is not information per se; rather, it is a 
product of evaluated information valued for its currency and relevance rather than its details or 
accuracy in contrast with data which typically refers to precise or particular information or ‘fact’ 
which typically refers to verified information. Sometimes called active data or “active 
intelligence,” these typically regard the current plans, discussions, and actions of people as these 
may have urgency or may otherwise be considered ‘valuable’ from the point of view of 
intelligence gathering organisations. Consequently, active intelligence is treated as a constantly 
mutable components, or variables within a large equation of understanding the secret, covert or 
otherwise private intelligence of an opponent or competitor, to answer questions or obtain 
advance warning of events and movements deemed to be important or other wise relevant 
(Wikipaedia, 2002).  
No matter how intelligence is seen as a concept, certain fundamental assumptions are 
immutable. First, intelligence is more often seen as evaluated information aimed at external 
targets: second, the information so gathered and evaluated is usually used for the purpose of 
national or regional security by the state or government. These initial realities made intelligence 
fall into the domain of the military, and defence and more often, espionage as the nucleus of 
intelligence.  
However, modern realities have made intelligence and intelligence gathering denote the 
assemblage of credible information with quality analysis. It refers to the information that has 
been evaluated and from which conclusions have been drawn. It is data that will be used 
proactively for strategic and tactical purposes (Onovo, 2004). Intelligence therefore include 
operational intelligence –used for planning and conducting campaigns and major operations, 
criminal intelligence used for tracking down criminals and for crime detection, competitive 
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intelligence – used by firms to outmanoeuvre one another,  and such other covert information 
gathering for the purpose of national and regional security. It will also include business security 
in a globalised and competitive world (Nte, 2008)  
Furthermore, it is needful to analyse the concept of ‘Externality’ and ‘Foreign’ which are 
the prime targets of intelligence activities, especially within a country with regards to criminal 
and business intelligence as it tend to pose some level of contradictions in the traditional 
meaning and focus of intelligence. However, this apparent contradiction can easily be resolved 
when a criminal is seen as a deviant  and external to the prevailing norms and values of the 
society and when a competing firm approximates a “battle theatre” intelligence gathering aimed 
these situations clearly identifies the external factors from the deviant or competitor (Nte, ibid) 
With respect to its mission, intelligence serves two purposes: first and foremost, to 
inform policy and second, to support operations, be they military, police or covert, with the 
ultimate goal of ensuring state security. The general consensus is that these two missions 
produce functions or roles which include; Collection, Analysis, Counter intelligence and Covert 
Action.  These roles are common to most intelligence systems, although many others and policy 
makers would prefer to exclude covert action. How they are distributed between and among 
elements of the intelligence organisation differ from state to state depending upon different 
threats and resources (Bruneau, 2008). In the same vein, these elements operate most effectively 
as part of a process in close conjunction with one another. Consequently, Godson (1986) in 
Bruneau (2008) asserts that: “it is difficult to imagine an effective system for collecting 
intelligence without the analysis that provides effective guidance or “tasking” to collectors. 
Counter intelligence is necessary to protect collectors from becoming known, neutralised, and 
exploited by hostile intelligence services. Similarly, successful programme of covert action must 
be grounded in effective collection, analysis and counter intelligence. The implication there from 
is that the nature of intelligence is such that the several elements of intelligence are parts of 
“single united system, whose success depends in all parts working effectively. In short, it must 
be “full service” intelligence system”.  
Indeed, because of the covert nature of intelligence gathering over time, the process has 
been significantly perversive in quite a lot of cases and in many countries. Before the 1970s for 
instance, the intelligence services of many countries such as the United Kingdom functioned on 
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the bases of executive decrees, there was no legal control to obtain permission before acting 
(Lord Demings Report, 1963). It was also the same, for the United States until the mid -1970s 
when terrible scandals involving domestic spying on anti-Vietnam war protesters and the 
revelations about illegal coverts operations and assassinations carried out by the Central 
Intelligence Authority (CIA). According to Leigh (2007), in the communist block, the utmost 
secrecy of intelligence blended perfectly and turned the agencies into repressive tools of the 
state. 
Furthermore, intelligence covert actions included atrocious killings, toppling of un co-
operative governments or those with different ideological leanings and even the sustenance of 
tyrannical regimes as long as its suits the national interest of the “invading” nations especially 
the super powers (USIS Country Plan for Nigeria 1976; Stockwell, 1978; Chinedu, 2007). These 
and others horrible crimes committed by the intelligence community popularised the general 
consensus on proper intelligence oversight.    
For neo-colonial and transitional democratic states like Nigeria, the situation is even 
more appalling as the intelligence community to a great extent is essentially an executive 
repressive tool. Colonial Nigeria for instance was a pure British colony completely under British 
control and surveillance. Intelligence activities was those that could ensure Nigeria’s 
subservience to the economic interest of Britain (Smith, 2004) .  
This national economic policy of Britain was so strong that independence elections were 
covertly manipulated to pave way for the apparently docile North to take over power through 
fraudulent census figures and elections. The role of the British intelligence community in 
enthroning this debilitating seed of discord and the deliberate balkanising of the country into 
mutually suspicious ethnic groups cannot be over emphasized. Nigeria incidentally inherited this 
arrangement as a post-colonial state and created a repressive intelligence community that 
collaborated with the executive to sustain state oppression of her citizenry. This work will 
therefore investigate the factors that sustained the perversion of Nigeria’s intelligence 
community with a view to offering useful suggestions that could drastically change the tide  
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Nature and Dynamics of Intelligence Gathering as a State Policy  
No matter the type of state in time and space, intelligence gathering has remained an 
integral part of state policy for the purpose of maintaining national security and interest. 
However, intelligence agencies and their intelligence gathering capacities are usually predicated 
on the degree of power they posses, the level of autonomy from external political control and the 
oversight  they  possibly  enjoy,  and  the  degree  of  their  penetration  of  the  society.  These  
prerequisites informed Peter Gills elaboration of W.W.Keller’s work by creating a model for 
modern state and its intelligence security services into a guiding typology (Gill, 1994; Bruneau, 
2008). The classification of the services was subsequently used to draw some conclusion about 
the nature of the state. He categorised security intelligence services in all types of political 
regimes whether authoritarian and democratic into three groups namely: 
* Bureau of Domestic Intelligence: under this arrangement, intelligence gathering 
activities are governed by a legal charter or statute, to gather criminal intelligence and lead up to 
the prosecution of security offenders. In most cases it does not conduct aggressive countering 
operations against citizens. The British M15 is a classical example.  
*Political Police: These operatives tend to have greater autonomy from democratic 
policy making and are precluded from legislative and judicial oversight than the bureau of 
domestic intelligence. They are greatly tied to the elitist and political group in the state. 
Generally, this group focuses in internal political opposition groups, often gathering intelligence 
outside specific criminal offences and conducting repressive counter operations against domestic 
political opposition to the existing regime. Most authoritarian regimes in Latin America, South 
East Asia and Africa fit into this paradigm.  
*Independent Security State: This denotes lack of external controls and monitoring, 
even from the authoritarian regimes it is supposedly protecting. The basic difference between 
this and the political police is that it determines its own goals which could be at variance 
with those of the political elites. It enjoys a high degree of autonomy from the routine political 
process. Its funding and policies are shield from government policy making process. The South 
Africa intelligence apparatus of F. W. De Klerk regime and the security under President 
Nicholae Cenucesu of Romania are good examples. Drawing form these aforesaid types of 
security intelligence services, the independent Security State’s penetration is the most extensive, 
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most powerful and most repressive while the political police is the least (Gill, ibid; Bruneau and 
Dombroski, 2001)  
 
  Table 1: Gills typology of security intelligence agencies  
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
Autonomy  
  
Penetration 
   
High  
High  Medium  Low  
A  
Independent state  
B  C  
Medium  D  E  
Political police  
F  
Low  G  H  I  
Domestic  
Intelligence Bureau  
 
(Adapted from Gill’s typology as produced by Bruneau, 2008) 
 
The model above gives mere possible classifications for security intelligence services – 
Box A hold the independent security state- It is autonomous from the rest of the state and 
penetrates deeply into government and society. Conversely, in Box I, is the domestic intelligence 
bureau – subjected to the control of the state and laves deep penetration. In between the two 
extremes are the political police in Box E.  
While the prospect of occupying box G and by the political police is feasible, the general 
consensus is that autonomy, self restrain penetrative and tight control should be the vital features 
of good intelligence services (Bruneau and Dombroski, 2001)  
Critics of Gill’s typology believe that this proposition did not make provision for 
comparative analysis and dynamics of intelligence agencies over time. This criticism led to the 
development of a graphical representation of intelligence agencies based on change in the 
independent variables of autonomy and penetration of society (Keller and Gill, 1994)  
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Figure 1: Types of Security Intelligence Services  
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                         (Adapted from Bruneau, 2008) 
 
 
Furthermore a more accurate tool for comparative analysis among states and within states 
over time would involve a pair of graphs showing the relative position of both states and their 
intelligence organisations. This is based on the assumption that there is a correlation between 
types of security intelligence apparatus and the classification of state regimes and that this 
relationship can be more easily compared in a graph rather than by simply using discrete boxes. 
In the same vein, rather than adopt Gill’s classification of regime types (Poly archival state, 
National security state, and Garrison state), the use of the more generally accepted classifications 
of democracy, authoritarian regime, and totalitarian state was adopted (Gills, Ibid)  
Figure 2 Gills Regime Paradigm 
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The citizens of democracy enjoy basic rights and freedom, seek alternative sources of 
information and rely on government policy making institution through elected officials. Thus 
policy makers try to balance security needs with social welfare expectations by ensuring that 
defence, police and security intelligence organization are subject to civilian oversight.  
Typically, authoritarian regimes are at best pure formal democracies, if there is 
semblance of democratic institutions. This type of regime is plagued by political conflicts and 
the repression of opposition, restriction of civil rights and security agencies granted exceptional 
powers during emergencies or wars. An authoritarian regime may graduate into a totalitarian 
state when it becomes preoccupied with threats to political power, both real and perceived, when 
the military and security intelligence structures dominate political activity, and when the ruling 
regime retains powers over its populace by extra-legal means leading to intimidation and terror 
by the state (Rienner, 2000;).  
The Nigeria state significantly fits into an authoritarian regime, where there are facades 
of democratic institutions since 1999, but with a state that is greatly intolerant to opposing views 
especially from (1999-2007) under Olusegun Obasanjo, a retired army general and former 
military head of state turned politician. Indeed, the level of intolerance resulted in the perversive 
use of the intelligence community in Nigeria, especially the economic and Financial Crime 
Commission (EFCC) and the State Security Services (SSS) to hunt dissenting voices and 
opposition including his estranged vice president Atiku Abubakar, and indeed all those who may 
have disagreed with Obasanjo in the past in a classical show of vindictiveness (Nte, 2008)                         
This situation contrasts with the use intelligence gathering as a positive state policy such 
as helping democratic powers to defeat Nazi Germany, in restraining the spread of communist 
ideology by force; in preventing the cold war from turning hot and nuclear; and through the 
monitory of arms control with Emergency intelligence (IMNIT) Electronics intelligence 
(ELINT) and Telemetry Intelligence (TELINT) in taming the arms race which has been 
embarked upon by super powers from getting out of hand. 
Nowadays, in the global war of terrorism, the lessons are again obvious: that intelligence 
has proven to be the most effective weapon against terrorism and that there is no substitute for 
intelligence services (Council on Foreign Relations, 2000). It is therefore the purview of this 
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work to make useful suggestions that has make intelligence gathering less perversive and 
positively useful to the state and its citizens. 
 
The Political and Historical Background of Nigeria 
Several dominant themes in Nigerian history are essential for understanding 
contemporary Nigerian politics and society. First, the spread of Islam in the North and later in 
South Western Nigeria as well, began a millennium ago. The creation of Sokoto caliphate in the 
Jihad (holy war) of 1804 - 08 brought most of the northern region and adjacent parts of Nigeria 
and Cameroon under a single Islamic government. This history helps account for the dichotomy 
between the north and the south which the colonial authorities encouraged for their socio-
economic benefits (Country Profile, 2008). 
Formal colonialism was a product of the Berlin conference and the Dual Mandate which 
made Nigeria a British colony with Lugard as first the high commissioner of the Protectorate of 
Northern Nigeria and the Governor General of the colony of Nigeria after the amalgamation of 
1914 against the wishes of people of Nigeria and without a recourse to consultation of the 
indigenous peoples of Nigeria. Thus Nigeria became a geographical entity, artificial in nature 
with less sense of a common Nigerian nationality. Inconsistencies in Britain policy reinforced 
cleavages based on regional animosities by attempting simultaneously to preserve the indigenous 
cultures of each area and to introduce modern technology and western political and social 
concepts. In the North, appeals to Islamic legitimately upheld the rule of the emirs so that 
nationalist sentiments there were decidedly anti- western. Modern nationalists in the South, 
whose thinking was shaped by European ideals, opposed indirect rule, which had entrenched 
what was considered to be anachronistic ruling class in power shut out the Westernized Nigerian 
elite.  
Consequently, at independence, power was under controversial circumstances, handed 
over to favoured elites from the northern part of the country, apparently to compensate them for 
pre-independence loyalty. With the exit of the British, the nation became hollow with no solid 
background, no sense of commitment and no sense of nation building in what late Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo referred to as a mere geographical expression (Agbowo, 2008). The end result is a 
country still struggling to take off even after forty eight years of independence. It is a nation 
994 
Nte, N. D. (2011). The use and ‘ab-use’ of intelligence in a transitional democracy: evidence from Nigeria. 
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 8:1. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com/en 
 
entrapped in series of development crises characterised by avoidable poverty, leadership 
recklessness, mind blowing corruption and unpredictable future, so severe that a few years ago, 
American Intelligence Report predicted an end to the Nigerian State within fifteen years. Even if 
that prediction can be considered to be too harsh or down right wrong because of some 
inexplicable survival strategy of Nigeria so far, it gives useful insights into the shaky and fragile 
nature of the Nigerian State (Okaba and Nte, 2008). The import of these analyses to intelligence 
gathering is that, given these realities, the intelligence community and its integrity, efficiency 
and independence will heavily be compromised.  
 
Nigeria’s Intelligence Community  
Traditionally, democratic states separate internal and external security, and thus also 
divide internal and external intelligence services. This underlines the different categories 
intelligence, by the fact that different rules and laws apply to intelligence operations on national 
soil and abroad, and by different missions (DCAF, 2003:23) Internal Intelligence obtain correlate 
and evaluate intelligence with regards to internal security while the missions may vary 
depending on the country. Be that as it may, all internal intelligence services have a common 
primary mission which is to provide support and assistance to the police and other law 
enforcement agencies, criminal justice, customs and boarder guards, and other regulatory 
agencies of the state. This is achieved by collecting security intelligence and building up a 
detailed body of knowledge for the prevention and countering of covertly organized threats, acts, 
and activities that relates to espionage, sabotage and subversion, terrorism, political, ethnic and 
religious extremism, organized crime, narcotics production and trafficking, money faking and 
money laundering, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal arms dealing, illegal 
immigration, arms and other smuggling, electronic attacks, hacking and dissemination of child 
pornography (Sokolski, 1994; Loch, 2002)  
In addition to the aforesaid range of activities, internal intelligence services also have a 
mission to conduct security checks on, or to do the vetting of, or nominees for sensitive 
government positions. In the course of achieving these tasks, internal intelligence services draw 
extensively from such sources of secret intelligence as interception of communications, 
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eavesdropping, surveillance and its own agents within the target organisation (Scalingi, 1995; 
Shulsky, 1987).  
At the external font, intelligence tries to obtain, correlate and evaluate foreign 
intelligence relevant to external security and for warning purposes. In doing this, external 
intelligence must try to accommodate the changing needs and aspirations of governments, and as 
well as national realities and requirements. The domains of external intelligence covers; support 
of security and foreign policies, detection of activities abroad that threaten security and national 
interest, information warfare, support for defence planning and military operations and economic 
intelligence (Shpiro, 2002; Sokolski, 1994; Johnson, 2002, Arquilla, 1994, Lind et. al., 1994; 
Gould and Spinney, 2001, Porteous, 1995 Augustini, 1995; Herman, 1998)  
Drawing from the above, and with clear identification of the span of intelligence 
activities in democratic states, Nigeria has organisations that are charged with the internal and 
external security of the country. It should however be noted that after the attainment of 
independence in 1960, the method of operation and areas of emphasis of the former ‘E’ 
department of the Nigeria Police (the special branch) - which was the first intelligence outfit to 
be established in the force need to be reorganised. The impact of the abortive coup of 1976 
accentuated the need to overhaul the security system and structures. This led to the establishment 
of  the Nigerian Security  organisation (NSO) by Decree No.  16 of  1976.  This  later  became the 
State Security Services (SSS) and remains civilian and public oriented since it operates within 
the civil society (Onovo, 2004).This agency is commonly known with the acronym SSS (State 
Security Services), reformed from the old National Security Organization (NSO) and derived it 
current legal existence from the national Security Agencies Decree 1986 (Cap 278LFN) as well 
as instrument No. SSS (Abuja) of 23rd May 1999, with the following mandate 
· Prevention and detection within Nigerian territorial borders of any crime against  the  
internal security of the Nigerian Federation 
· Protection and preservation of all non-military classified materials concerning the 
            Internal security of Nigeria 
· Prevention, detection and investigation of espionage, subversion, sabotage,                 
terrorism, economic crimes with national security implications    
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· Provision of protective services for designated principal government functionaries as the 
President, Vice President etc., sensitive installations and visiting diplomatic dignitaries 
while vetting prospective public office appointees and passport applicants as well as 
preventing undesirable individuals from venturing into Nigeria.  
 
In meeting above oversight roles, security intelligence operations and surveillances are 
planned, coordinated, consolidated, then executed by the SSS with the primary objective to 
thwart, eliminate any threat to the internal security of the nation, 
  
Today the Intelligence Community (IC) in Nigeria can be said to include the following 
organizations and agencies:  
 
· The Nigeria Police  
· Nigerian Armed Forces( Army, Navy and Air Force Intelligence)  
· Nigeria Intelligence Agency (NIA)  
·  Directorate of State Security Services  
· Security and criminal intelligence  Bureau of the Nigeria Police  
· Nigeria Immigration Services (NIS)  
· Nigeria Prison Service (NPS)  
· Nigeria Customs Service (NCS)  
· National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)  
· National Economic Intelligence Agency (NEIA)  
· Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and any such Committees that may 
be charged with intelligence gathering and management in Nigeria. 
 
While the above list includes more of law enforcement agencies, they are part of the 
intelligence gathering organisations in Nigeria. More so, the fact that proper reformation of the 
intelligence sector in Nigeria is yet to take place it makes it a bit difficult to effectively delineate 
the intelligence sector in the country. For this discourse, all the aforesaid agencies constitute the 
Intelligence Community.  
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Each of these agencies have various modes of operation designed to ensure the over all 
internal and external security of the nation in their own sphere of responsibilities. More so, it is 
the Directorate of State Security Services that has and ought to continue to have, a purely civilian 
focus in its responsibilities. The police on its part are, and should continue to be the largest 
consumer of its intelligence, although this important reality was undermined by the 1976 and to 
some extent the 1979 constitutional realities.  More so, it is important to note that while most 
analyses try to separate pure intelligence agencies from law enforcement agencies, the nuance 
between them is so strong that for developing nations like Nigeria which focus more on internal 
threats and domestic intelligence, it seems better to integrate intelligence and law enforcement 
for any useful analysis. This is against the backdrop that even in advanced nations, the 
dichotomy is blurring by the day. 
In Nigeria, it is also note worthy to assert that each member of the intelligence 
community has rules, regulations orders and directives, designed to ensure the security of 
intelligence. Consequently, within the community the classification of information into Top 
Secret, Secret, Confidential and Restricted, (internal security matters are usually, classified under 
Top Secret Categories) tends to remain a permanent feature. Personnel dealing with such 
classified information are usually sworn to an oath of secrecy to prevent leakages. The necessity 
of limitation of access to classified information is usually guided by the principles of  
(i) Need to know  
(ii) Need to hold and  
(iii) Need to take  
The resultant effect of this is the obvious fact that inter-agency intelligence gathering and 
sharing has been fraught with barriers and poses obstacles to effective intelligence management 
in Nigeria. These barriers include.  
· Lack of articulate process for generating and sharing intelligence   
· Existence of restriction laws that hamper access to information  
· The laborious hierarchical structures of intelligence sharing  
· Deficits in criminal intelligence sharing  
· Lack of modern technologies to support intelligence sharing  ( Ige, 2004; Onovo, 2004; 
Nwizu, 2004 ) 
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It is against this back drop that there is a strong call for radical intelligence reforms that will 
reposition the intelligence community in Nigeria to cope with challenges of intelligence 
gathering and management in a rapidly globalising world with myriads of internal and external 
threats.  
 
Determinants of Nigeria’s Intelligence Gathering Capacity  
In all societies no matter the level of development and type of government, certain 
conditions determine the intelligence gathering capacity of the state. These conditions can 
conveniently be located in the intelligence circle for proper understanding.  
Intelligence professional are quite conversant with the intelligence circle which consists 
of five closely interconnected aspects:  
(1) Establishing collection requirements  
(2) The collection itself  
(3) Processing and exploitation of the collected materials  
(4) Analysis and production of the result, and  
(5) Dissemination of the product to the decision makers. 
Because of the continuous national of the intelligence circle, feed back is also continuous. 
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Figure 3: Intelligence Cycle Diagram 
 
 
Diagram as illustrated by U.S. Department of Defense. DoD Security Institute (DODSI). DODSI 
Security Awareness Bulletin 2-94 (August, 1994). 
 
Based on the above illustration, the intelligence gathering capacity of Nigeria can therefore 
be determined by:  
 
(A) Requirements: How much do policy makers know with regards to what to ask for. The 
most serious problem is that they don’t know what they don’t know, and are therefore 
unable to define the requirement. Even if they do know what they don’t know, can they 
clearly express what it is that they want to know?  
 
Finally, do policy makers know who to ask if the intelligence community has more than one 
agency as in the case of Nigeria? The most common basic problem regarding decision makers 
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and intelligence is the pervasive ignorance of the capabilities, and limitation, of intelligence, 
accentuated by the neglect of both what intelligence  professional can do and the politicisation of 
the organization and the product. A very serious problem for those working in the intelligence is 
that they at times forget that intelligence as a product, process, and organization, does not have a 
value unto itself but only in terms of informing policy makers so that they can in fact make the 
best possible decisions (Bruneau, 2008). This is more pronounced in a society characterized by 
extreme materialism and the privatization of the government by a few powerful elites  
 
(B) Collection: Another determinant is whether there are collection means that can answer 
the requirements? Or are the agencies and their collection means, committed to the past 
such as to ex colonial masters, Britain and subservient to American imperial influence 
and unable to appreciate and evaluate the realities of such threats as international 
terrorism, religious conflicts and insurgency within the country. This fixated interest on 
a particular target at the expense of others costs Americans massive losses of lives and 
property in the 9/11 attacks. In the same vein, how long will intelligence collection 
satisfy the policy makers’ requirements and perhaps interests as intelligence must be 
prompt to retain its value. Finally, how reliable are the collection assets? In the lead up 
to the invasion of Iraq, there were strong indications that president Bush relied 
extensively on Dr. Ahmed Chalabi, head of the Iraq National Congress, who provided 
highly subjective information (Ricks, 2008)  
(C) Analysis: Furthermore, can effective analysis of raw intelligence be effectively handled 
by the Nigeria intelligence community. Experience has shown that even in advanced 
democracies such as the United States, this challenge is daunting. In transitional 
democracies world wide, the challenge is even magnified as they are faced with perhaps 
incompetent hands and ability to evaluate contemporary threats. More importantly is the 
use of analytic products. This is quite important because the consumption of this product 
could have far reaching consequences like in the case of the US and UK and the Iraqi 
invasion, and the ETA terrorist attack in Madrid, Spain in 2004 (Olmeda, 2005)  
(D) Dissemination: This looks at the distribution net work of intelligence. Do the products 
get to the right users in a timely manner? In Nigeria, the   intelligence community from 
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the military, the SSS, Customs, Immigration, NDLEA, EFCC etc may share criminal 
intelligence with the police through the Inspector General of Police or State 
Commissioner, and during the monthly Joint Intelligence Board meetings. However, the 
current frame work is inadequate as it cannot respond swiftly to the growing rate of 
insecurity and the apparent sophistication of the perpetrators. This situation makes the 
need for national policy on inter-agency intelligence sharing imperative and urgent 
(Onovo, 2004) 
 
The Democratic Challenges of Nigeria  
The impregnable democratic challenges facing Nigeria and has greatly undermined the 
legitimacy of its government cannot fully be appreciated without a critical look of the nature of 
the post-colonial state in Nigeria. The crystallisation of post colonial social formations in Nigeria 
led to the emergence of the current state and the inherent class contradictions predicated on the 
endless struggle for the control of state power.  
Interestingly, the emergence of the Nigerian post colonial peripheral state fell short of the 
real mature capitalist state based on a specific institutionalized modality of class domination and 
characterized by an apparent differentiation and dissociation of class domination from the 
hegemonic ruling class, the constitution, socio-economic forces, capital and labour, and ever 
from the civil society itself (Ake, 1985; Eteng, 1998, Nte, 2005).  
The autonomization of the mature capitalist societies therefore tend to moderate a lot of 
extremities of exploitation by institutionalising the equal legal treatment of the unequal the 
unequal being ‘capital’ and ‘labour’ and other producers. A major implication of the foregoing is 
that capitalist social democracy strives to thrive in most leading western nations; largely because 
the core democratic values of FRATERNITY (Popular Sovereignty), LIBERTY (People’s 
human rights embedded in the Rule of Law and Due Process) and EQUALITY (People’s Socio-
Economic Rights) are embedded and practised by the people who regard them as fundamental 
values supportive of democracy (Nnoli, 1994; Eteng, 1998)  
Unfortunately, Nigeria’s attempt to evolve towards capitalist lines, based on western 
models got convoluted and enmeshed with perennial legitimacy crisis, caused by the lack of the 
essential ingredients needed to nurture sustainable democracy. This stems largely from the nature 
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of state formation in Nigeria and the insincere colonial parliamentary democracy bequeathed to 
Nigeria at independence. As a result of this, cases of manifest violence and repression by the 
Nigerian state arose from its low grass root legitimacy, its perennial inability to deliver, the 
cupidity of the mangers of state power, and their desperation to perpetuate themselves in power, 
and their emasculation of the rule of law in the process (Eteng, Ibid; Nte and Irikana, 
forthcoming).  
Subsequently political developments in Nigeria exposed the lucrative nature of politics as 
government was conceived more of a vehicle of distributing bounties to party faithfuls than an 
agent of economic development. Access to state power was and still remains a passport to 
appropriate the social surplus generated by oil wealth which has emerged as the pivot of the 
economy. Misappropriation of public funds by public officers remains rife. Cohen (1974) noted 
that where finance on any scale has available to Nigeria, it was loosely linked to the capture of 
political power by the elite group.  Public corporations and some companies were indeed run as 
an extension of political parties, while unreserved access to political power, particularly at the 
regional level was used as a means to finance private investment or more private consumption. 
Although, this tend to be the regular feature of most petro-economies in the developing world, 
some of them have actually broken away from pure primitive accumulation and are moving 
towards significant national development. Nigeria seems to be locked up in this development 
quagmire due to the aforesaid reasons.  
The “juicy” Nigerian state therefore created a lot of ‘money bags, military adventurist 
and desperate politicians who institutionalised corruption and fuelled conflicts between the 
different classes, subgroups and regions to maintain the status quo. The net result is failed 
attempts to conduct the business of government along democratic lines (Nte, 2005)  
The democratic challenges of Nigeria is a story of tall dreams and failed dreams of men 
and women willing to tow the line of global democratic dictates but cannot because of the 
inherent internal contradictions in the state, of failed aspirations, and of failed democracy. The 
seed of Nigeria’s failed democracy was sown by the departing colonial powers who wanted 
certain groups to take over, even by crook, apparently to protect their economic interest. 
Thereafter, democratic transitions in Nigeria have been tales of woe. From the violent general 
elections of 1964 to the first military coup of January 16, 1966, the democratic culture of Nigeria 
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was rooted in violence and counter violence laced with ethno-religious coloration by the ruling 
class to gain popularity and acceptance (Nte and Ekpenyong, 2007; Ekpenyong and Oarhe, 2007; 
Nte and Irikana, forthcoming). Out of the fifty years of post independence Nigeria, the military 
ruled for about twenty eight years while a semblance of democracy has been in practice for just 
over twenty years.  
However it must also be noted that parliamentary, democracy was practised from 1960-
1966 while the American model of presidential democracy, was introduced in 1979. In the same 
vein, the military regimes in Nigeria were characterized by unprecedented violence resulting 
from coups, counter coups and indeed the Nigeria- Biafra civil war that lasted from 1967-1970. 
During the civilian regimes, violence has not been less. The 1964 general elections were mired 
with violence of unprecedented proportion. The 1979 and 1983 elections also witnessed 
exponential orgy of violence leading to murders and arson on a reckless scale. For each of these 
democratic mistakes, the military will step in, in a coup de tat with a pledge to “correct” the ills 
of the civilians only to magnify the problem. The trend continued in this classical trend and led 
to the annulment of the most credible election ever conducted in Nigeria in 1992 which was 
supposedly won by late Chief M.K.O.Abiola by General Ibrahim Babaginda.  
By 1999 when the military had ruled Nigeria for the greater part of her post independence 
history, expectations were high  that genuine democracy would emerge out of one of the most 
brutal regimes under General Sanni Abacha in Nigeria. Unfortunately, the military ‘midwifed’ an 
electoral process that enthroned one of their own, Olusegun Obansajo who for eight years could 
not break away from the garrison mentality and conducted state affairs in military style. Courts’ 
and other judicial proclamations were flagrantly ignored and the presidency was essentially 
personified around him. Opposition voices and groups were repressed. Military invasions were 
rife, especially in the Niger Delta region and parts of the country where his opponents come 
from. These were the lots of Odi and Zaki Ibiam. The zenith of his arrogance of Military 
democracy was his ambitious attempt to change the constitution to enable him run for a third 
term. 
It was the combined efforts of the opposition that thwarted this ambition before he 
reluctantly selected Umaru Yar’adua in an election that all the observers - both local and 
international adjudge to be the worst election conducted so far in Nigeria’s democratic history. 
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All the observers are unanimous that the elections fail significantly below local and international 
standards. A summary of the Human Rights Watch Report on the 2007 polls indicated that 
National polls in 1999 and 2003 were systematically rigged and local government polls in 2004 
was plagued by similar abuses. It stated that 2007 poll was among the worst in the world as the 
elections reflected deep seated patterns of abuse that characterise the day to day conduct of many 
public officers. In the same vein, the report noted that many political figures openly recruited and 
armed gangs to unleash terror upon their opponents and ordinary members of the public. Some of 
these groups, such as the ones in the Niger Delta have become a law unto themselves, spreading 
violence and insecurity throughout the rest of Niger Delta. Indeed these groups keyed into the 
genuine agitations in the region to become the terrorising insurgents in the Niger Delta region of 
Nigeria (Human Right Watch, 2007, Nte; 2008). 
Although the current president Yar’adua who came into power through a flawed election 
has shown serious respect for the rule of law and significant aversion to corruption so far, it is 
yet  to  be seen if  he can effectively sanitise  the electoral  process  and lay a  solid  foundation for  
sustainable democracy in Nigeria. His presidency is suffering from severe legitimacy crisis and 
requires concerted efforts by the current regime to vigorously pursue genuine reconciliation, de-
militarisation of the polity and national integration for a take off into standard democracy. So far, 
most analysts see this regime as vestiges of the immediate past military democracy, and see 
Yar’adua as being too slow for a dramatic over haul of the polity. The veracity or otherwise of 
these positions remain largely conjectural. 
The impact of the failed democratic experiences in Nigeria on the Intelligence 
Community and her intelligence gathering capacity cannot be over emphasised. This is because 
the credibility of intelligence in a polity that is over shadowed by primordial and nepotic 
sentiments cannot be guaranteed. More so, evidence abound, while certain person were hunted 
by the internal criminal intelligence agencies, others are treated as sacred cow. 
Similarly recent probes into the activities of the Petroleum Technology Development 
Fund (PTDF) and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation(NNPC) revealed monumental 
fraud linked to Obasanjo’s presidency  and his cronies under the watch of the Economic and 
Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) which embarked on differential investigation and arrests 
of perceived opponents of president Obasanjo. These democratic anomalies in Nigeria also call 
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for dramatic reform of intelligence along democratic norms which most transitional democratic 
regimes have embarked upon with reasonable success. 
 
Conflicts and Intelligence Gathering in Nigeria  
Conflicts of various shades have been pervasive in Nigeria from colonial Nigeria till date. 
The Aba Women riots of 1929 and the Iseyin riots against the Indirect Rule Policy of colonial 
Britain were some classical examples of resistance in colonial Nigeria and remained landmark 
political historical epochs in the country. Similarly, the Enugu Coal Miners Riots of 1953, 
through to the Maitasine Riots of 1980, the Ahmadu Bello University Riot of 1986 to the 1993 
Political/Demonstration /Riots created challenges that queried the readiness of the intelligence 
community to handle internal security threats in Nigeria.  
Furthermore, in Nigeria conflicts tend to full into three major categories, each of which 
has the capacity to destabilise the country if not properly managed. These include; ethno-
religious conflicts which has cost the lives of more than 10,000 Nigerians in the North since 
1999, where Muslim predominate. This in addition to such conflicts as the Zagon-Kataf riot in 
Kaduna, the Kano Riots, the Bauchi Riots and such other sectarian riots that have remained 
significant threatening  forces to the corporate existence of Nigeria (Suberu, 1996 ; Ekpenyong 
and Oarhe 2007). According to the United States Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, Islamic extremist activities in the northern part are being funded by foreign sources. 
Although the report did not specify the foreign source, it cited Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan as 
funding the construction of Mosques and religious schools and asserted that Nigeria clerics 
trained in Saudi Arabia had been indoctrinated in Islamic extremism. This group according to the 
report promotes hatred and violence against non-Muslims (USCIRF Report, 2005). It was not 
until a year later, and perhaps acting on the above report that the Nigeria intelligence community 
raised an alarm of the existence of a possible militants belonging to this group in the intelligence 
gathering and jihadist operations at the behest of foreign powers (Country Profile, 2005). This 
reactive and some what lousy posture of the Nigerian Intelligence community has been 
responsible to series of intelligence fiasco and monumental losses in lives and property resulting 
from ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria.  
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Another threatening conflict in Nigeria which has greatly undermined the intelligence 
efficiency of the intelligence community in Nigeria is political conflicts which has led to wide 
spread killing, arson and destroyed the democratic foundations. It has also exposed the weakness 
of the intelligence community in handling high profile political related assassinations in Nigeria 
as shown in the table below: 
 
Table 2 List of Unsolved Murders in Nigeria 
 
NAME DATE POLITICAL IDENTITY 
Sunday Ugwu Sept 9, 1999 Killed in mistaken identity for his elder brother, a 
member of Enugu State House of Assembly 
Lai Balogun  Dec. 2000 A frontline politician and Architect  
Dan Kemibagha Dec. 2001 Counsel to Odi Youth and Bayelsa 
Bola Ige Dec. 23, 2000 Serving Minister of Justice and Attorney General, and 
former Power minister 
Odunayo Olagbigu Dec. 21, 2001 Member, Osun State House of Assembly  
Monday Ndor Tambari Dec. 18, 2001 Minority leader, Rivers State House of Assembly 
John M. Agatutu Dec. 2002 PDP, Delta central senatorial district aspirate  
Isyaku Mohammed  Dec. 2002 UNPP Party Captain  
Janet Olapaole Aug. 13, 2002 PDP leader in Odigbo Local Government, Ondo State 
Ade Awonusi Jan. 7, 2002 Confidential Secretary to the Chief Justice of the 
Federation  
Prof. Chinere Ikoku Oct. 2003 PDP Captain and former vice chancellor University of 
Nigeria 
Ajibola Olanipekun June. 20, 2003 PDP Captain in Ibadan Oyo State 
Joyce M. Fatai May 3, 2003 Former Commissioner for Women Affairs 
Young Dimegwu April 20, 2005 ANPP Member, Imo State House of Assembly 
Onyewuchi Iwuchukwu April 19, 2003 ANPP Stalwart in Ikeduru, Imo State 
Yemi Oni March 2003 AD Stalwart in Ekiti State Counsellorship candidate and 
ANPP member in Anambra State  
Anthony Nwodo March 21,2003 Secretary to ANPP Ozza north local council  
Rasaki Ibrahim March 20, 2003 PDP Stalwart in Kwara State 
Marshal Harry March 5, 2003 PDP Student and South –South Vice Chairman of the 
party before directing to the ANPP 
Theodore Agbatu Feb. 22,2003 Principal Secretary to Imo State Governor  
Ogbonaya Uche Feb 8, 2003 A Chieftain of ANPP in Imo State 
Ayo Daramola August 14, 2004 Governorship Aspirant in Ekiti State 
Philip Olorinipa March 7, 2004 Kogi State Electoral Commissioner 
Luke Shingaba March 4, 2004 Chairmanship candidate in Bassa local Council Kogi 
State 
Andrew Agoma March 3, 2004 PDP member Board of Trustees 
Aminasoari Dikibo Jan. 6, 2004 South – South Vice Chairman of PDP 
Anthony Ozioko July 27, 2005 PDP Assistant National Director of Research and 
Planning  
Lateef Olaniyan June 3, 2005 Association of the Strongman of Ibadan Politics Lamido 
Adedibu 
Alabi Olapokun May 15, 2005 Associate of Rauf Aregbasola of Lagos State 
1007 
Nte, N. D. (2011). The use and ‘ab-use’ of intelligence in a transitional democracy: evidence from Nigeria. 
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 8:1. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com/en 
 
Sunday Atte Feb. 5, 2005 Leader of the legislature General Yagba East Kogi State  
Omolulu Falobi Oct. 6, 2006  Founding Executive Director of JA Aids 
Mohammed Iman Sept. 2006 ANPP State Chairman, Bornu State. 
Funsho Williams July. 27, 2006 PDP Governorship Aspirant Lagos State 
Jesse Anikwu June 30, 2006 ACD Governorship Aspirant 
Godwin Agbroko Dec. 2006 Editor of This Day News Paper 
Segun Oladimeji Sept. 2007 PDP House Member, Federal House of Representatives 
for Oyo State. 
Segun Awanebi May 30, 2007 Former  Chief  Security  Officer  to  Olusegun Agagu 
Governor of Ogun State 
Sources: - Nigeria Police Crime File and Weekly Spectator; Nov. 4, 2007. 
 
  First, it must be noted that beyond the above year, a lot of unsolved murders have 
remained quite high till date with the rise of ethnic militias, sectarian violence and ideological 
primitivism in the country. An analysis of the above table shows that the bulk of the murders 
over of 95% were politically motivated and virtually all investigations into these murders have 
reach a dead ends without any results. The list is also not all inclusive as most other 
assassinations of other innocent Nigerians are either not reported or the victims regarded as not 
prominent enough to be documented. The reasons are not far-fetched. Firstly, the fact that there 
are several cases of covert obstruction of the investigation process by the political class 
undermines the collection of criminal intelligence. Secondly, the non independence of the 
intelligence community to the executive and its subservience further undermines its effectiveness 
in criminal and internal intelligence gathering. The bottom line to be drawn here is that political 
conflicts which are quite pervasive in Nigeria have remained a challenge to the internal security 
of the country. 
The third threatening conflict in Nigeria in the Niger Delta crisis which started as genuine 
agitation against the oppressive nature of the Nigeria State dominated by the majority groups 
against the oil producing minorities of the Niger Delta. These agitations were initially political 
prior to independence leading to the famous Willink’s Commission of 1958. By 1996, Major 
Adaka Boro staged a 12-revolution against the Nigeria State which was crushed. Today the 
struggle has ballooned into a full fledged insurgency currently spearheaded by a militant group 
known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
MEND is seeking a more equitable distribution of Nigeria’s oil wealth and since 2006, 
the Militias have attacked oil instillations and kidnapped foreign oil workers in an effort to press 
home their demands. Today the activities have widened to include the kidnapping of high profile 
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politicians and their relations for ransom. In the same vein, oil production has been reduced by 
about 30%, aggravating the pressure on the world oil prices. The emergence of criminal 
dimensions and terror further complicates the security situation in the regime and the nation in 
general (Nte, 2008).   
The current insurgency in the Niger Delta poses critical dilemma to the intelligence 
community (IC) and the local populace because “The citizen live continually under the threat of 
violent death. In the presence of the permanent danger surrounding them, they have the 
depressing feelings of being isolated and defenceless targets. The fact that the public authority 
and the police are no longer capable of ensuring the security adds to their distress. They lose 
confidence in the sate whose inherent mission it is to guarantee their safety. They are more and 
more drawn to the side of the insurgents, who alone are able to protect them (in the most active 
stages of the insurgency) (Trinqueir, 1961).  
This is the pitiable paradox of insurgency who can the average person trust? How can he 
/she continue rely on for his /her welfare? How can he/she continue to earn an honest and 
honourable living? All law and order are in jeopardy, because chaos serves the cause of the 
insurgents (Cordesman, 2005). Though seemingly uncontrollable public violence, attacks against 
government establishments, its buildings, infrastructures. Officials, against the local authorities, 
insurgent cells break down public faith in and reliance on the government in-being. Popular 
support (or at least public passivity) is the mean by which the insurgents can exist, but chaos is 
the way by which they sever government authority over the local populace. The insurgents 
achieve this favourable condition of chaos through mass terror, public murder, coercion, 
sabotage of the economy, and intimidation. According to Galula (1964) “if anarchy prevails the 
insurgents will find all the facilities they need in order to meet, to travel, to contact people, to 
make known their programmes, to find and organise the early supporters, to receive and to 
distribute funds to agitate and to subvert, or to launch a wide spread campaign of terrorism”. 
Intelligence in a counter insurgency is usually, a difficult task because in most cases the 
insurgents’ intelligence is far superior to that of the government forces. This is due to the fact 
that the insurgents operate on the terrain that is most familiar to them and their supporters. They 
grew up in the terrain, understand its advantages and traps, know where their supporters are 
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located and where they can procure men and materials to support and sustain their base of 
operations (Trinquier, 1961:63). 
Furthermore because the “insurgents having no responsibility are free to use every trick; 
they are judged by what they promise (and in this case resource control for the Niger Delta 
region) and not what they actually do. Consequently propaganda is a powerful tool for them. On 
the other hand, counter insurgency must be tied to tangible responsibilities not propaganda 
(Galula, 1964). How can therefore the intelligence community sustain an intelligence effort when 
its local agents are assassinated and the local people intimidated? Unfortunately, the best 
information will come from these sources. This creates a full circle, for the Nigerian state to 
create a secure environment, to ensure a steady flow of intelligence from the local populace, and 
to contain the current rage of insurgency in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  
 
Conclusion  
This study in all modesty, has tried to comprehensively tackle the phenomenon of 
intelligence gathering which is a state policy in all societies no matter the level of development. 
In doing that the study tried to provide useful insight into the concept of intelligence gathering 
taking into considerations the basic elements of intelligence gathering which could significantly 
be influenced by the type of government prevalent in a state. In the same vein, intelligence 
gathering is a subjective enterprise. However, some countries especially in the advanced 
countries of the world try to give some semblance of objectivity through democratic intelligence 
reforms. This does not however completely insulate the business of intelligence gathering and 
management from abuse by the executive arm.  
In developing countries such as Nigeria which is currently battling with a shaky 
democratic experience, intelligence gathering could be largely perversive. This perversion stem 
from the colonial and post colonial experience of Nigeria which created a repressive state that is 
constantly battling with legitimacy and the consequential violent posture against dissenting 
voices and groups.  
In the same vein, the study also found out that the lumping together of unrelated groups 
for the socio-economic convenience of Britain and subsequent manipulation of independence 
election to favour a section of the country created deep seated ethnic sentiments in the country. 
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The result of this is an intelligence community which is plagued with nepotism, ethnic 
segregation and subservience to the ruling class. It is therefore common to manipulate the 
intelligence community to suit the whims and caprices of the executive.  
The result of this is the abdication of the traditional responsibility of the intelligence 
community and the manipulation of same to the advantage of the executive. Furthermore, the 
failed democratic efforts of Nigeria so far have further cast serious doubt on the efficiency of the 
intelligence community. The faulty colonial political foundation, long period of militarism, and 
convoluted albeit ‘twisted’ democracy represent a dark epoch in Nigeria’s political history and 
further compounded the intelligence quagmire in the country.  
Today, the intelligence community to grossly ill equipped to manage the internal threats 
and to a greater extent the external threats from a rapidly globalizing and insecure world. With 
the emergence of President Umar Musa Yar’Adua who for some time has shown reasonable 
respect for the rule of law apparently due to his purely civilian background holds some level of 
hope. Although his government is facing serious legitimacy crisis arising from a disgraceful 
election of April 2007 adjudged by both local and international observers as the worst so far, and 
falls below local and international standards, Yar’adua appear serious with the idea to reposition 
governance and to enthrone real democracy. This if achieved will greatly enhance the efficiency 
of the intelligence community in Nigeria. The death of Y’aradua and the subsequent emergence 
of Goodluck Jonathan has signalled some level of democratic consolidation and better civil-
military relations. Be that as it may it is the view of this work that certain steps must be taken by 
the Nigerian State to ensure an intelligence community and intelligence gathering process that 
can perform its traditional function of guaranteeing the internal and external security of the 
country. This is against the backdrop of renewed insecurity in the country with new dimensions 
such as bomb blasts and ideological extremism. 
 
Recommendations 
  Intelligence gathering and administration tend to thrive best under democratic 
environments where the rights and freedom of citizens are protected, and where the security of 
the nation is monitored and protected for the benefits the entire citizens. In the light of the 
foregoing and based on the failed democratic experience of Nigeria so far, it is important that the 
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first step for Nigeria under President Umar Yar’adua should strive to expedite action to ensure 
the passage of the freedom of information bill which will enable Nigeria peel back the veils of 
secrecy that allow many government officials to conceal the evidence of their misdeeds by 
denying access to even the most basic government held information. 
There should be a sincere electoral reform programme that will guarantee the 
independence of the electoral body to be able conduct credible election that will reflect the 
wishes of the masses. There should be a transparent and comprehensive enquiry into allegations 
of corruption, vote rigging and sponsorship of political violence at all levels of government since 
the return to civilian rule, beginning with an examination of Nigeria’ April 2007 Elections. The 
investigation should uncover the architects and sponsors to send the right message for a sound 
democratic foundation. The Nigeria police must make political violence an investigative priority 
and be given the autonomy and resources for effective and impartial investigations. 
Nigeria’s international partners should be forthright in criticising the short comings of Nigeria’s 
democracy that infringe upon the rights of its populace and insist on meaningful reform. 
Finally, the political class in Nigeria must recognise the need to organise elections in civilised 
manners that will guarantee and respect the wishes of the masses. 
For the intelligence community and intelligence gathering in Nigeria, Massive reforms need to 
be embarked upon to ensure. 
Relevance and Effectiveness: While it is well known that change is a hardly ever easy, 
redirecting intelligence service from a repressive agenda to that which upholds new democratic 
principles and accepting democratic control is particularly difficult task. This is prominently 
evident for governments which have been slow to enact reforms and which –mainly due to 
economic problems, short comings of privatisation, and other legacies of the past –see 
themselves confronted with mounting social unrest and waning popular support.  
Some reforms have been hampered due to the lack of democratic experience (Linz and Stephen, 
1996) and the weakness of the law. The weakness of the law is particularly visible in the 
‘security sector’ where the major institutions have all too long claimed primary responsibility for 
security form foreign enemies and a chiefly undefined range of domestic challenges. In most 
countries of transition including Nigeria, that claim is bolstered by the absence of civilian 
knowledge of an experience in the military, intelligence and national security domain.  
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Thus assembling the most knowledgeable civilian brains is one of the prerequisites to 
reform. More over, a sufficient number of civilians need to be trained and outside advice and 
assistance might be required. In the face of these challenges, intelligence reforms in transitional 
democracies live Nigeria should strive to: 
  Define and delineate clearly defined mission upon each of the intelligence services, and 
limit regular intelligence collection to specific categories of security concerns, while at the same 
time recognising human rights and fundamental freedom of citizens there should be  
 
· Clear guidance and co-ordination of the intelligence services  
· Control, supervision and over sight of the services  
· There should be the Professionalisation of the intelligence service  
· There should be the strengthening the relationship between legislation and reform and  
· Ensuring practical measures to enforce the programme of change and reforms ( Bozhilov, 
2002)  
Finally, one of the most contemporary issues in intelligence sector is democratic 
oversight of the intelligence sector which is a follow up of the proposed reforms enunciated 
above and remains the major pre occupation of experts in intelligence. The fundamental 
difficulty that intelligence oversight poses is the conundrum of how to provide democratic 
control of a governmental function and institutions which are essential to the survival and 
flourishing of the state, but which must operate to a certain extent in justifiable secrecy.  
In the case of security and intelligence and in contrast to many other areas of government 
activity, it is widely accepted that official communications and operations can only be 
transparent to a limited extent; otherwise, the relevant operations, sources and assets will be 
compromised. This therefore suggests that the prevailing pattern of oversight for the government 
activities needs to be adapted for the circumstances of security and intelligence, yet that the need 
for rigorous control is greater, not less, than in the case of more mundane activities such as 
education or welfare (Born and Leigh, 2007).  
The necessary secrecy surrounding security and intelligence runs the risk of encouraging 
and providing cover for illegal and ethnically dubious practices on the part of the agencies 
involved. The democratic process itself may be subverted by the infiltration of political parties, 
1013 
Nte, N. D. (2011). The use and ‘ab-use’ of intelligence in a transitional democracy: evidence from Nigeria. 
International Journal of Human Sciences [Online]. 8:1. Available: http://www.insanbilimleri.com/en 
 
trade unions or civil society groups in the name of security and intelligence. The privacy of 
countless of individuals may be interfered with by the collection, storage and dissemination of 
personal data, whether accurate or flawed. Inefficiency and corruption may go unchecked. In the 
midst of these, and the fact that in Nigeria, so far legislative oversight of the intelligence sector 
has been just the frequent hearings and budgets approvals (Ndubuisi, 2008). Intelligence 
oversight in Nigeria should involve the following: 
 Ensure transparency to ensure increased intelligence community effectiveness. This 
should be followed by proceedings to establish and augment accountability and openness of the 
intelligence process while moving away from the “culture of secrecy” inherited from the military 
regimes.  
There should be effective democratic control (executive, legislative and judicial) of the 
intelligence agencies. The executive control (tasking prioritizing, and making resources 
available) should be exercised by the executive. The legislative control and oversight by 
(Standing/Permanent Committees) should include: setting the legal framework on the 
organization and mandates of intelligence; assessing the implementation of the legislation; 
producing IC funds and holding IC accountable for its expenditures, reviewing IC activities; and 
consuming intelligence. Judicial control consists of ensuring the legality of the intelligence 
community activities (for e.g., obtaining a warrant from the public prosecutor in order to carry 
out acts that infringe upon the privacy of citizens).  
There should be informal oversight such as from the press – the press should step in to 
inform Nigerians and the international community of the activities of the IC and its excesses and 
this will encourage government to make reforms (Ndubisi, 2008).  
The aforesaid steps it taken in the opinion of the author will greatly transmute perversive 
intelligence gathering and management into responsible intelligence gathering for national 
security and the ultimate guarantee of the rights and freedom of Nigerian citizens.  
 
Limitations of the Study  
In the course of this study, certain facts have and will continue to challenge the quality of 
the work. These factors did not however erode an acceptable credibility of the study. Some of the 
factors are;  
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Lack of co-operation: the covert nature of intelligence gathering made it difficult for 
officials of the intelligence community to provide all the needed information. Consequently the 
study turned to secondary sources for data collection.  
Limited Time: The time needed to prepare a work of this magnitude is inadequate.  However, 
within the available time the author made use of the available time to present this study in this 
form. A longer time could definitely have produced a better work.  
Limited resources: The resource available for the conduct of research is quite limited. 
Besides, this area of study is new and not encouraged by the state as it tends to divulge the 
weakness of the state especially in transitional democracies. It is therefore the opinion of the 
author that funding should be directed into this relatively new area of study in Nigeria and indeed 
Africa.  
Finally, the tone of this paper is significantly radical. This may not go down well with 
bourgeois scholars. I accept full responsibility for all the views expressed there in and whatever 
loop holes found should be accepted as part of my oversight and could stimulate further research 
to fix the study properly. 
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